Modeling Efficiency of Foreign Aid Allocation in Malawi by White, Philip A. et al.
Modeling Efficiency of Foreign Aid Allocation in Malawi
Philip A. White∗1, Candace Berrett†2, E. Shannon Neeley-Tass‡2, and Michael G. Findley§3
1Department of Statistics, Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
2Department of Statistics, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA
3Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
November 3, 2017
Abstract
The Open Aid Malawi initiative has collected an unprecedented database that identifies as
much location-specific information as possible for each of over 2500 individual foreign aid
donations to Malawi since 2003. Ensuring efficient use and distribution of that aid is important
to donors and to Malawi citizens. However, because of individual donor goals and difficulty
in tracking donor coordination, determining presence or absence of efficient aid allocation
is difficult. We compare several Bayesian spatial generalized linear mixed models to relate
aid allocation to various economic indicators within seven donation sectors. We find that the
spatial gamma regression model best predicts current aid allocation. Using this model, first
we use inferences on coefficients to examine whether or not there is evidence of efficient aid
allocation within each sector. Second, we use this model to determine a more efficient aid
allocation scenario and compare this scenario to the current allocation to provide insight for
future aid donations.
Keywords: SGLMM, gamma regression, Bayesian, donor collaboration
1 Introduction
Each year, wealthy countries and international organizations send billions of dollars in foreign
aid to developing countries across the world. The Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) estimates that in 2015 the United States alone donated 31.1 billion
dollars in development assistance and that other developed countries are donating anywhere
between 700 million and 19 billion US dollars (OECD, 2015). Aid giving is thus big business,
and we need to understand better whether the business operates in the service of its so-called
clients in recipient countries or rather in service of its own interests.
Donors’ motives are varied, ranging from pursuing strategic interest (Alesina and Dollar,
2000) to trying to facilitate positive social and economic outcomes. And yet, with so much
spent on development assistance, donors, governments, and citizens may want these donations
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to be allocated efficiently — providing money to places and situations with the most need.
Even where strategic interest concerns are high, and therefore aid may not be allocated with
need in mind, foreign aid can affect peoples’ lives in non-trivial ways, for better or for worse.
Thus, stakeholders in both recipient and donor countries deserve to know whether aid is in
fact allocated in ways that respond to and meet the needs of recipient countries. For example,
donations meant for improving education should ideally be sent to those places within the
country where education is suffering the most.
Several initiatives have been introduced to improve aid targeting and coordination, includ-
ing the Paris Declaration of 2005 which called for better alignment between government ob-
jectives and donor aid allocation (Aced, 2009; Findley et al., 2016). However, communication
among donors and recipients, as well as donors and other donors, in order to track and effi-
ciently allocate the vast array of projects has proven nearly impossible. Moreover, there has
been a dearth of scholarly attempts to track the complexity of aid allocation and so both aca-
demics and policy makers have a poor understanding of the patterns of foreign aid allocation.
Because so much hangs in the balance, answers to the question of efficient aid allocation are
sorely needed.
In 2011, the government of Malawi, together with the University of Texas at Austin’s Cli-
mate Change and African Political Stability team, began efforts to collect and display donor
information at the subnational level (Findley et al., 2011; Weaver et al., 2014). This initiative
— Open Aid Malawi — resulted in an unprecedented and unique database containing as much
location-specific information as possible for each individual donation to Malawi since 2003
(Peratsakis et al., 2012). This database contains over 2500 tracked donations all at the subna-
tional level, to date the largest of its kind. Such a large and detailed resource makes it possible
to examine donor aid across various project sectors.
Malawi is a particularly interesting country for examining aid allocation. Malawi’s econ-
omy, education, and public health, are some of the least developed anywhere in the world.
Specifically, they have an infant mortality rate of 69.3 for every 1,000 births, 50.7% of the
population live below the poverty line, a 68.2% literacy rate, and agricultural goods are their
leading export (National Statistical Office, 2015). In an effort to improve circumstances in
Malawi, a large number of foreign donors support economic, health, and educational develop-
ment and improvement plans in Malawi. In contrast to most highly impoverished countries,
Malawi has experienced almost no violence, making it an ideal location to study aid allocation
patterns as the presence of violence makes stable aid allocation patterns difficult. Put differ-
ently, given its political stability Malawi is a most likely case to observe donors responding to
need, and we thus explore in this paper the extent to which donors in fact allocate based on
indicators of need.
Because so much aid is sent to Malawi and because of its need for hastened development,
the question of whether aid is allocated efficiently is paramount both for taxpayers in donor
countries as well as citizens affected by aid in recipient countries. We are specifically inter-
ested in quantifying how assistance is being allocated within the country to determine whether
sectoral aid matches sectoral need. In particular, we focus on seven project sectors or dona-
tion types: (1) Agriculture; (2) Education; (3) Governance; (4) Health; (5) Rural Development
[RD]; (6) Roads, Public Works, and Transportation [RPT]; and (7) Water, Sanitation, and Irri-
gation [WSI].
Using district-specific economic, social, and demographic data (hereafter referred to as
“economic indicators”), we model foreign aid allocation in all districts for these project sec-
tors. While we do not expect the economic indicators to be the sole driving forces behind
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aid allocation, by donors own admission they should be key factors in determining whether
or not aid is being allocated efficiently. Therefore, our goals are, first, identifying high-level
economic indicators that are related to aid allocation while accounting for and making use of
spatial dependence; second, determining the ability of our model to capture a true relation-
ship between aid distribution and the economic indicators; and third, to propose an efficient
allocation scenario and its discrepancy from the actual allocation in order to inform future
donations.
Analyses attempting to measure donor coordination in Malawi using this novel data set
have begun. For example, comparing donations before and after the Paris Declaration of 2005
with various economic and demographic indicators, Nunnenkamp et al. (2015) found no evi-
dence of increased donor coordination across sectors. De and Becker (2015) used instrumental
variable techniques to show evidence of improved economic conditions at the local level from
aid donations, emphasizing the need and ability for donors to coordinate their efforts using lo-
cal economic indicators. Using a model to accurately capture the skewness present in aid data,
we seek to significantly expand on these analyses by exploring the extent of the spatial depen-
dence of the different sectors and to account for this spatial dependence to make inferences
about relationships between donations and economic indicators at the local level.
Common analysis tools in the literature that examine aid allocation on this and other data
sets include multiple regression (Feeny, 2007; Nunnenkamp et al., 2015), probit and Tobit
regression (Collier and Dollar, 2002; Dietrich, 2013; De and Becker, 2015), poisson regres-
sion (Masaki, 2017), structural equation models and two-stage least squares (Collier and Dol-
lar, 2002; Dietrich and Wright, 2015), and mixed effects models (Hodler and Raschky, 2014;
Joablonski, 2014; Briggs, 2017). As geocoded aid data becomes more readily available, mod-
els that account for spatial dependence are becoming more common. For example, van Weezel
(2015) used a Bayesian normally-distributed mixed model with a spatial random effect to ex-
amine the relationship between foreign aid and civil conflict. Nunnenkamp et al. (2017) study
the motivation (i.e. need, merit, or politics) for aid allocation in India using a spatial two-stage
least squares. Runfola et al. (2017) developed a methodology which they call geoSIMEX to
account for different levels of spatial imprecision that arise when aid allocation data is reported
at various spatial resolutions. Our model helps build on and expand the growing literature that
accounts for spatial dependence in the modeling of foreign aid allocation data.
In this manuscript, we examine donation allocation within Malawi at the subnational level
using a Bayesian spatial gamma regression model. We describe the data in more detail in Sec-
tion 2. In Section 3 we explicitly define the model used for analysis as well as the comparison
models. In Section 4.1 we provide an in-depth analysis of the various model parameters and
their interpretations and implications for aid allocation in Malawi, contrasting these results
with a more ideal allocation scenario in Section 4.2. Finally, we provide concluding remarks
in Section 5.
2 Data
The Open Aid Malawi database (Peratsakis et al., 2012) contains over 2500 donations spanning
the years 2003 to 2016. Each donation total (in US dollars; USD) corresponds to a specific
project and its intended project sector (Agriculture; Education; Governance; Health; Rural De-
velopment; Roads, Public Works, and Transport; and Water, Sanitation, and Irrigation). The
database also contains the spatial location and “precision” or level at which a project’s dona-
tion was designated (e.g., country, region, district, city). Figures 1a-1d illustrate the different
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(a) Country Level Donations (b) Region Level Donations (c) District Level Donations
(d) Point Level Donations (e) Summed Donations (f) Histogram of Donations
Figure 1: Money per person for donations at the various levels of available location information.
Figures (a) – (c) show maps of money per person for (a) donations made to the entire country, (b)
donations made to the individual northern, central, and southern regions, and (c) donations made to
the individual districts. Figure (d) shows a map of the locations of city and point-wise donations.
Figure (e) shows the total money per person within each district. Finally, (f) shows a histogram of
the donations per person within each project sector and district.
precisions at which a project’s donation could be assigned. For example, Figure 1b shows the
total money per person assigned to the three regions (North, Central, South) in Malawi, while
Figure 1d shows the locations of project donations assigned to a city (orange circle points) or
a more specific latitude-longitude (green stars).
In addition to the donation data, we also have population and economic indicator data for
each district from the 2008 Malawi census (National Statistical Office, 2008). These economic
indicators include: proportion of people in poverty, average distance of people to schools
(km), number of recently (within two weeks) injured people, food spending as a percentage of
all expenses, mean area cultivated per household, and proportion of population with electric
lighting. Descriptions of the variables are in Table 1; all covariates were standardized across
districts to have a mean zero and variance one. However, we do not have these values for the
three smallest districts – Likoma (a small island in Lake Malawi), Neno (split in 2003 from
Mwanza), and Area under National Administration (various locations across the country). To
accommodate this lack of information, we combined the donations to Neno and Mwanza (as
they only recently split) and removed the other two districts from the analysis.
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Because our economic indicator data is only available at the district level, we aggregated all
the donation data to the district level. For the country- and region-level donations, we assumed
these were dispersed proportionally among the districts according to district population. Ad-
ditionally, each individual project could have several subprojects and each subproject could be
assigned to a different location. However, only the total project donation amount is reported in
the database and not the donation for the specific subproject. In this case, we divided the total
project donation amount equally among the subprojects. Our final donation data is the total
donation sum for each district in USD by project sector. Figure 1e shows the total donations
per person summed across project sectors. We expect that more money should be sent to those
districts with more people, thus we use dollars per person as the response variable by dividing
the district donation total for each project sector by the district population.
For the dataset used in the analysis, the total sample size is N = 182 since the data contain
dollars donated per person in 26 districts for seven project sectors. Figure 1f shows a histogram
of all 182 observed dollars per person for each sector and district, where the most extreme value
is $265.42 per person.
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Table 1: Names and descriptions of the data variables used in the analysis.
Variable Abbreviation Description
Sectors
Agriculture Agriculture Donations assigned to development of agriculture
Education Education Donations assigned to education development
Governance Governance Donations assigned to both economic and democratic governance
Health Health Donations assigned to for development of health initiatives
Integrated Rural Development RD Donations assigned for rural development
Roads, Public Works, and Transportation RPT Donations assigned to developing roads, transportation, and other public works
Water, Sanitation, and Irrigation WSI Donations assigned to water, sanitation, and irrigation development
Economic Indicators
Proportion in Poverty Poverty Percent of population living below the national poverty line
Distance to School Dist to School Average distance (km) across households to the nearest school in each district
All Injured All Injured Number injured or ill in the previous 2 weeks (as of the 2008 census) in each district
Food as % of Expenditures Food % Average percent of household expenditures spent on food in each district
Mean Land Cultivated per House Land Cultivated Average area cultivated per household (in hectres) in each district
Electric Lighting Proportion Electric % Percent of households in the district with electric lighting
Population Population Population of each district
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3 Model
3.1 Model Definition
We expect some quantities, like agricultural output, public health outcomes, or non-urban ar-
eas, to be grouped spatially; therefore, it is plausible that accounting for spatial dependence
could improve model performance in terms of prediction and inferences. The normal linear re-
gression model with spatial random effects is a standard model for spatially-distributed quanti-
ties (Banerjee et al., 2014). Because our data is strictly positive and right-skewed, we consider
more general models. Following Diggle et al. (1998), we make use of a spatial generalized
linear mixed model (SGLMM).
Let Yij be the dollars per person (USD) for the ith district (i = 1, . . . , n, where n = 26)
and the jth project sector (j = 1, . . . , J , where J = 7). We model
Yij |µij , θ ∼ f(yij |µij , θ),
where µij = E(Yij |βj , φij , θ) and θ is an applicable scale parameter (for example, for the
normal distribution, this is the common variance parameter). We model the mean using a link
function, g(·),
g(µij) = x
′
ijβj + φij , (1)
where xij is a k × 1 vector of covariates (economic indicators) for the ith district and the
jth project sector, βj is a k × 1 vector of coefficients for each sector, and φij is a spatial
random effect where each sector has its own spatial dependence structure. Because we expect
a combination of the economic indicators to be related to aid allocation within each sector, we
fit a sector-specific coefficient for each of the seven economic indicators (including population)
as well as a sector-specific intercept to account for the different amounts of aid appointed to
each sector. Therefore, there are k = 8 coefficients for each sector, or 56 total coefficients in
our model.
Following Hughes and Haran (2013), we account for potential spatial confounding by using
the Moran basis on the spatial random effect. Let φj = (φ1j , . . . , φ26,j)′ be the vector of
spatial random effects for sector j and model this with an intrinsic conditionally autoregressive
(CAR; see, e.g., Besag, 1974; Banerjee et al., 2014) prior:
pi(φj |σ2) ∝
(
1
σ2
)rank(Q)/2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
φ′jQφj
}
,
where σ2 is a variance parameter and Q = diag(A1) − A is a precision matrix where A
is the n × n binary neighborhood matrix such that Aik = 1 for i 6= k if districts i and
k share a border and Aik = 0 otherwise, and 1 is an n × 1 vector of ones. As detailed
by Reich et al. (2006), the spatial random effect may be correlated with spatially-dependent
covariates, creating collinearity between the model coefficients, β, and the spatial random
effect, φ, inhibiting model inferences and interpretability. Thus, Hughes and Haran (2013)
propose to remove confounding by using the Moran basis to approximate the spatial random
effect:
φj ≈Mδj ,
where M is fixed to be the first r eigenvectors of P⊥AP⊥, where P⊥ = (I−X(X′X)−1X′)
and X is the n× k matrix consisting of a column of ones and the economic indicators for each
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location, and δj is the r × 1 vector of coefficients. Then,
pi(δj |σ2) ∝
(
1
σ2
)r/2
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
δ′j(M
′QM)δj
}
,
making M′QM the precision matrix for δj . Thus, rather than modeling the spatial random
effect directly through φj , we model δj . In our analysis, we set r = 7 making the total number
of parameters in each spatial model equal to (k × J) + (r × J) + 2 = 107.
Finally, for the remaining parameters we use relatively non-informative prior distributions.
Specifically,
θ ∼ Inverse-Gamma(aθ, bθ)
β ∼ Normal(0, s2I)
σ2 ∼ Inverse-Gamma(aσ, bσ)
where aθ = 0.01, bθ = 0.01, s2 = 10000, aσ = 0.01, bσ = 0.01. We select these values for
the hyperparameters so that our prior distributions are diffuse.
3.2 Model Selection
We consider eight Bayesian models, comparing both spatial and non-spatial models using
gamma, log-normal, normal, and Weibull likelihood distributions (see Table 2; Appendix A
shows the parameterizations used for each likelihood distribution). For the models using the
Weibull likelihood distribution, instead of modeling the mean, µij , as a linear combination
of the covariates, we model the parameter, λij = µij/Γ(1 + 1/θ), as done in, for example,
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002). For the non-spatial models, we assume φij ≡ 0 for all i and
j in equation (1).
Table 2 also defines the link function used for each model. We chose these link functions
because they are commonly-used for each likelihood and they are often used due to compu-
tational convenience McCullagh and Nelder (1989). For example, the canonical link for the
Gamma distribution is the inverse link, but this link is not always positive and has vertical
asymptotes.
We fit three chains (using different starting values) for each model using an adaptive
Metropolis random walk sampler (Roberts and Rosenthal, 2009) for 1500000 iterations us-
ing code written in R (R Core Team, 2016). For memory, we saved only every tenth draw.
Of the saved draws, we kept the final 30000 as post-burn-in posterior draws. We checked for
convergence by monitoring trace plots and computing Geweke’s convergence diagnostic within
chains Geweke (1992) and Gelman-Rubin convergence diagnostic between chains Gelman and
Rubin (1992) using the R package coda (Plummer et al., 2006). For all models and all chains,
less than 1% of Geweke diagnostics on parameters from all models and all chains exceeded 3
(or were below -3) and none were above (below) 3.8 (-3.8). No Gelman-Rubin multivariate
diagnostic exceeded 1.1, and the maximum univariate diagnostic value was 1.3, but almost all
were below 1.1. We also computed Monte Carlo standard errors using the R package mcmcse
(Flegal et al., 2017) and these values are included with all parameter estimates in Appendix C.
We are interested in the model that performs the best in predicting foreign aid for each
sector in each district; therefore, we use the posterior predictive distribution,
f(ynew | y) =
∫
Ψ
f(ynew | ψ)pi(ψ|y) dψ, (2)
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Table 2: Models used for comparison. Note that for the Weibull likelihood, the link is on the scale
parameter, λ, instead of the mean, µ.
Model Likelihood: f(yij|µij, θ) Link: g(µij) Spatial Dependence
1 Gamma log(µij) No
2 Gamma log(µij) Yes
3 Log-normal µij No
4 Log-normal µij Yes
5 Normal µij No
6 Normal µij Yes
7 Weibull log(λij) No
8 Weibull log(λij) Yes
Table 3: Observed mean absolute error (MAE), mean squared error (MSE), and deviance informa-
tion criteria (DIC) for the eight posed models. The smallest number for each criterion is bolded.
Model MAE MSE DIC
1 Non-spatial Gamma 10.36 623.88 3574.69
2 Spatial Gamma 8.93 495.23 3568.18
3 Non-spatial Log-normal 10.09 513.63 3740.24
4 Spatial Log-normal 10.17 494.06 3910.73
5 Non-spatial Normal 11.06 436.83 4028.86
6 Spatial Normal 10.83 420.02 4194.91
7 Non-spatial Weibull 13.70 544.23 3814.99
8 Spatial Weibull 12.19 529.77 3860.22
where ψ is the set of all model parameters and Ψ is its parameter space, for each model to de-
termine which model most accurately predicts foreign aid in Malawi. We consider both mean
squared error (MSE) and mean absolute error (MAE) between the posterior predictive mean
and observed donations. We also compute deviance information criteria (DIC; Spiegelhalter
et al., 2002, 2014) for model comparison.
Table 3 shows the MAE and MSE for the in-sample predictions from each of the mod-
els. In most cases, the spatial models out predict their non-spatial counterparts; however, the
improvement is modest. Additionally, other than the spatial gamma model, the DIC is larger
for the spatial models than for their non-spatial counterparts. This indicates that while some
spatial dependence is present, the additional parameters may not be worth adding for the small
gains in model fit. In this case, however, we believe a spatial model is important especially
as geocoded aid data and economic data become more sophisticated and available. That said,
Model 2, or the spatial gamma model, provides the smallest MAE and the smallest DIC. Al-
though its DIC is comparable to the non-spatial gamma model, the MSE is much smaller.
Model 6, or the spatial normal model, has the smallest MSE. This is due to an anomalously
high value in the RPT sector (see Figure 5 in Appendix B) that no model captures well, but
the normal model captures best and therefore its MSE is less affected by the outlier. This im-
provement in model fit is not seen in the MAE of the normal model because the outlier does
not affect the MAE as much as the MSE.
Table 3 shows that while there are some differences in model fit, all models fit the data
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quite similarly. Therefore, in our analysis, we focus on the spatial gamma model because this
is the model with the smallest DIC and MAE.
4 Analysis
In this section, we examine the parameters and fitted values of the spatial gamma model de-
scribed in Section 3. In Section 4.1, we discuss evidences for and against donor collaboration
or efficient aid allocation by examining the posterior distributions of the model coefficients.
We conduct an in-depth study in Section 4.2 to identify potential areas for improved aid allo-
cation.
4.1 Parameter Estimates and Interpretation
Table 4 shows posterior means and standard deviations for all regression coefficients β as well
as the marginal posterior probabilities that each regression coefficient is greater than 0. We
use these posterior probabilities to examine the relationship between the economic indicator
and the donations within a sector. Bolded values correspond to coefficients with posterior
probability greater than 0.9 of being either positive or negative.
We use the relationships between aid and the economic indicators to determine whether or
not there is evidence of efficient aid allocation. For example, for the Education sector, if aid is
being allocated efficiently, we would expect education aid to be positively related to distance
to school (greater distances to school on average indicate a greater need for education aid). In
large part, though, there is not evidence that the economic indicators are related to districts’
aid per person within a sector at all. Many of the coefficient posterior distributions envelop 0
(those non-bolded coefficients). In fact, two sectors – Governance and Water, Sanitation, and
Irrigation (WSI) – appear to not be related to any of the economic indicators. For Governance,
this isn’t surprising as more than 50% of the donations from that sector were given at the
country or region level (see Figure 1a and 1b), and we assigned these projects equally per
person to each of the districts within the country or region, respectively. For WSI, however, this
is not the case and is more likely explained by WSI aid not being influenced by the economic
indicators.
There are, however, several coefficients that provide evidence of efficient aid allocation.
For example, mean land cultivated per household has a 0.95 posterior probability of being
positively related to agriculture aid. This makes sense since more land cultivated indicates
more agricultural areas and thus more need for agricultural aid. Additionally, distance to school
is positively related to RD aid (0.98 posterior probability), as expected, since districts where
the people are farther from a school tend to be more rural and thus would benefit from RD aid.
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Table 4: Summary of the posterior distributions of the coefficients of the spatial gamma model. ‘P (> 0)’ means the posterior probability
that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficients (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability of being
either positive or negative are bolded. RD=Integrated Rural Development; RPT=Roads, Public Works, & Transportation; WSI=Water,
Sanitation, Irrigation.
Sector Agriculture Education Governance Health RD RPT WSI
Covariate mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd) mean (sd)
P (> 0) P (> 0) P (> 0) P (> 0) P (> 0) P (> 0) P (> 0)
Intercept 3.55 (0.08) 3.5 (0.08) 4.21 (0.03) 4.46 (0.03) 2.69 (0.12) 2.54 (0.17) 2.76 (0.12)
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Poverty -0.08 (0.11) 0.09 (0.12) -0.02 (0.06) 0.07 (0.04) -0.29 (0.18) 0.34 (0.22) -0.07 (0.21)
0.22 0.80 0.37 0.97 0.04 0.94 0.37
Dist to School 0.00 (0.13) -0.16 (0.14) 0.03 (0.07) -0.02 (0.05) 0.42 (0.2) -0.11 (0.24) 0.21 (0.23)
0.49 0.13 0.66 0.31 0.98 0.31 0.81
All Injured -0.17 (0.11) 0.17 (0.09) 0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.04) -0.14 (0.15) 0.59 (0.16) 0.06 (0.15)
0.06 0.97 0.52 0.65 0.17 1.00 0.66
Food % 0.1 (0.13) 0.04 (0.17) -0.01 (0.05) 0.00 (0.04) 0.06 (0.15) -0.68 (0.17) -0.15 (0.17)
0.81 0.5 0.42 0.43 0.64 0 0.16
Land Cultivated 0.13 (0.08) -0.02 (0.08) -0.02 (0.04) -0.11 (0.03) -0.08 (0.12) -0.52 (0.12) -0.03 (0.12)
0.95 0.43 0.31 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.38
Electric % 0.20 (0.07) -0.03 (0.08) 0.03 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03) 0.08 (0.09) 0.94 (0.12) -0.15 (0.17)
0.99 0.37 0.80 0.93 0.81 1.00 0.19
Population -0.05 (0.10) -0.06 (0.09) 0.04 (0.04) -0.02 (0.03) -0.11 (0.10) 0.39 (0.11) 0.09 (0.13)
0.34 0.28 0.85 0.25 0.13 1.00 0.78
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In contrast, poverty has a posterior probability of 0.96 of being negatively related to RD aid.
This means that as the proportion of the population living below the poverty line increases, the
amount of RD aid decreases, contradicting what we would expect for efficient aid allocation.
Also, number injured is positively related to education aid (posterior probability of 0.97), but
there is not an intuitive reason for why this would make sense. A natural economic indicator
for education would be distance to school, but this relationship is weaker (and negative – the
opposite of what we would expect).
Several economic indicator variables are related to the RPT sector. This is likely due to
a large outlier in this sector, visible in Figure 1f. That said, the positive relationship between
poverty proportion, electric lighting proportion, and population with RPT aid, and the negative
relationship between food as a percent of expenditures and mean land cultivated per household
with RPT aid indicate that RPT aid is primarily being given to highly populated and less rural
areas. This does not match intuition. We would expect more total money would be needed in
populated and urban areas, but that more money per person would be needed in rural areas for
building and maintaining roads, public works, and transportation.
Because the eight models fit similarly (see Table 3), we provide coefficient summaries for
all models and all coefficients in Appendix C. As expected, the coefficients follow similar
patterns across models and most of the time, models find the same variables to have high
posterior probabilities of being different from zero.
Obviously, these interpretations of coefficients are conditional on the values of the other
covariates and multicollinearity among the covariates could introduce changes in the values of
the coefficients when some covariates are left out of the model (thus changing interpretations).
However, there is not much collinearity between the economic indicators, the highest absolute
value correlation is 0.3, with most absolute value correlations less than 0.15. Table 5 provides
variance inflation factors (VIF) for each economic indicator and scaled generalized variance
inflation factors (GVIF; Fox and Monette, 1992) which account for the interaction between
sector and each economic indicator. All VIF’s are below the commonly-used rule of thumb of
five to indicate concerning multicollinearity (see, e.g., Dobson and Barnett, 2008). That said,
interpretations of the coefficients must be made with care.
Figure 2 shows plots of observed, posterior predictive means, and the residuals of total do-
nations, and donations for Governance and RD. Plots for the remaining sectors are in Appendix
B in Figures 4 and 5.
4.2 More Efficient Aid Allocation
Although we do not expect the economic indicators to be perfect drivers of aid allocation, they
can provide direction for better aid allocation. In this section, we consider the scenario where
aid is allocated according to a more expected or ideal relationship with specific economic in-
dicators. We call this scenario our “efficient scenario.” By doing this, we can first examine the
potential for our model to capture a “true” relationship between aid and economic indicators.
Second, and more important for donors as they identify locations to send aid, is to identify
locations where more or less aid is needed within each sector.
To accomplish this task, we select a single economic indicator for each sector and iden-
tify its expected relationship to aid, shown in Table 6. We then use the posterior distributions
from the fitted model of Section 4.1, but adjust the coefficients for these selected economic
indicators. Specifically, we set the mean of the corresponding coefficient of each economic
indicator of interest to be three posterior standard deviations above (or below for a negative
12
(a) Total Donation
(b) Governance
(c) Rural Development
Figure 2: Observed (left), predicted (center), and residual (right) donations plots for total donations
(a) and the Governance (b) and RD (c) sectors. All values are in USD.
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relationship) zero. For example, the adjusted mean of the coefficient corresponding to Land
Cultivated for Agriculture is set to 0.24 (see Table 4), while the other coefficients for the Agri-
culture sector remain at the original posterior mean. Then, the adjusted posterior distribution
on the coefficients is
β∗ ∼ N(β¯∗,Σ(β)), (3)
where β¯∗ is the adjusted posterior mean of β as described above and Σ(β) is the posterior vari-
ance of β from the fitted spatial gamma model in Section 4.1. The posterior correlation among
the β’s was quite small, and thus Σ(β) could also be a diagonal matrix with the marginal
variances of each coefficient on the diagonal.
We then obtain adjusted posterior predictive distributions on aid per person for each sec-
tor using equation (2), but with the adjusted posterior distribution of β. The computational
algorithm is as follows:
1. Draw a value of β∗ from equation (3).
2. Use a draw of φ and θ from the posterior draws obtained in Section 4.1.
3. Draw a value of the adjusted aid allocation, y∗ij , for each i and j from the gamma likeli-
hood, conditional on the values in steps 1 and 2.
4. Scale y∗ij so that the new sector totals are the same as the data sector totals:
∑26
i=1 y
∗
ij =∑26
i=1 yij . (This requires that the total money within a sector does not change, only its
distribution across the districts.)
5. Repeat for all post-burn-in posterior draws.
We can then use these draws from the adjusted posterior predictive distributions to make infer-
ences on aid allocation.
To learn about the ability of our model to identify a “true” relationship, we refit the spatial
gamma model to 26 randomly selected draws from the adjusted posterior predictive distribu-
tion. In this way we are making use of frequentist sampling distribution ideas to compute a
power-type diagnostic. For these 26 randomly selected draws, using a 90% posterior proba-
bility of being greater than zero (or less than zero for expected negative relationships) cut-off,
we would have identified a relationship 85% of the time. This is a bit lower than 90%, but this
may be due to re-scaling the data to keep total donation amounts the same. Notably, however,
we never found a relationship in the opposite direction; i.e., a parameter that was truly positive
(negative) never had a 90% posterior probability of being negative (positive). Recall that RPT
was positively related to electric lighting proportion – the opposite of what we would hope to
Table 5: Variance inflation factors (VIF) and scaled Generalized VIF’s (GVIF) for economic indi-
cator variables.
Covariate VIF GVIF1/14
Poverty 2.49 1.58
Dist to School 3.54 1.88
All Injured 2.36 1.54
Food % 1.94 1.39
Land Cultivated 1.40 1.18
Electric % 1.21 1.10
Population 1.11 1.05
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Sector Economic Indicator Expected Relationship
Agriculture Land Cultivated Positive
Education Dist to School Positive
Governance Poverty Positive
Health All Injured Positive
RD Electric % Negative
RPT Electric % Negative
WSI Land Cultivated Positive
Table 6: Selected economic indicator for each sector and the corresponding direction of the rela-
tionship.
see. This simulation study provides more evidence that if RPT aid were actually negatively re-
lated to electric lighting proportion, we would not have found this strong positive relationship.
Finally, we compare the adjusted posterior predictive distributions of donation amounts to
the observed donation amounts. Figure 3 shows standardized residual maps; specifically, for
district i and sector j,
rij =
yij − y¯∗ij
SD(y∗ij)
,
where yij is the observed aid per person, y¯∗ij is the mean of the adjusted posterior predictive
distribution of aid per person, and SD(y∗ij) is the standard deviation of the adjusted posterior
predictive distribution of aid per person. By standardizing this way, we can compare differ-
ences between the predictive means and the observed values relative to the variation of the
predictive distributions, so that a large difference between the observed and predictive means
is either dampened or enhanced by a large or small standard deviation, respectively. In Figure
3, darker orange values indicate that more aid is going to these locations than our efficient
scenario suggests, while dark purple values indicate that less aid is going to these locations
than our efficient scenario suggests. Looking at total donations per person within each district,
many of the districts that indicate more need for aid are on the western side of Malawi.
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Figure 3: Standardized residual maps between the observed and efficient scenario donations per
person for each sector and for all sectors combined (bottom right).
5 Conclusion
Foreign aid is important for many countries’ economies and its allocation can be even more
important to both the donors and citizens within the receiving country. But efficient allocation
is a difficult problem and identifying whether or not it is occurring is difficult too. In this paper,
we made use of a unique dataset and examined how aid allocation within Malawi is related
to various economic indicators within seven donation sectors. We found some evidence of
efficient allocation, but on the whole, there is not evidence that aid is being allocated according
to economic indicators. Additionally, because it is so hard to efficiently allocate donations,
there is a need for identifying ways to help. We also used this model to develop a more
efficient aid allocation according to a specific subset of the economic indicators and provided
maps of adjustments to current aid allocation.
Although most countries do not have databases with similar location-specific information
on donations, these methods can be applied to examine efficiency of cross-national aid alloca-
tion. And as more subnational geocoded aid data become available, these methods will become
16
more relevant.
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A Likelihood Parameterizations
In this appendix we include the parameterization used for each likelihood distribution in Mod-
els 1–8. For brevity, we drop subscript notation so that below, yij = y, µij = µ, xij = x, and
βj = β.
Gamma
f(y|µ, θ) =
(µ
θ
)µ2/θ 1
Γ(µ2/θ)
y(µ
2/θ)−1 exp{−yµ/θ},
where E(y|µ, θ) = µ and Var(y|µ, θ) = θ.
Lognormal
f(y|µ, θ) = 1√
2piθy
exp
{
− 1
2θ
(log y − µ)2
}
,
where E(log y|µ, θ) = µ and Var(log y|µ, θ) = θ.
Normal
f(y|µ, θ) = 1√
2piθ
exp
{
− 1
2θ
(y − µ)2
}
,
where E(y|µ, θ) = µ and Var(y|µ, θ) = θ.
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Weibull
f(y|λ, θ) = θ
λ
(y
λ
)θ−1
exp
{
−
(y
λ
)θ}
,
where E(y|λ, θ) = λΓ(1 + 1/θ) and Var(y|λ, θ) = λ2(Γ(1 + 2/θ) − Γ(1 + 1/θ)2).
Note that this parameterization corresponds to the Weibull regression model found in
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) as follows. As in our models, let log λ = x′β =
β0 +x
′
1β1, where β0 corresponds to the intercept, x1 corresponds to the vector of covari-
ates without the intercept, and β1 corresponds to the remaining vector of coefficients (all
the coefficients without the intercept). Then, the pdf in (2.8) of Kalbfleisch and Prentice
(2002) can be written by letting θ = γ, exp{−β0} = λ, and −β1θ = β where the pa-
rameters on the right correspond to the notation used in Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002)
and the parameters on the left correspond to the parameters used in our model.
B Predicted Values
Figures 4 and 5 provide additional plots of the observed, predicted, and residual values of
donations per person for each sector.
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(a) Agriculture
(b) Education
(c) Health
Figure 4: Observed (left), predicted (center), and residual (right) donations plots for Agriculture,
Education, and Health sectors. All values are in USD.
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(a) Roads, Public Works and Transportation
(b) Water, Sanitation, and Irrigation
Figure 5: Observed (left), predicted (center), and residual (right) donations plots for RPT and WSI
sectors. Outliers (in observed and residual donations of the RPT sector) are colored brown with
values marked on the color legends. All values are in USD.
C Coefficient Estimates
Tables 7–13 provide the posterior mean of each coefficient along with the corresponding monte
carlo standard errors and posterior probabilities that the coefficient is greater than 0 for all
models and sectors.
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Table 7: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the Agriculture sector. P(>0) means the posterior
probability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability
of being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 3.58 (0.001) -0.1 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) -0.14 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.11 (0.001) 0.19 (0.001) -0.05 (0.001)
1 0.07 0.7 0.02 0.82 0.98 1 0.2
2 3.55 (0.002) -0.08 (0.003) 0 (0.003) -0.17 (0.003) 0.1 (0.003) 0.13 (0.002) 0.2 (0.002) -0.05 (0.002)
1 0.22 0.49 0.06 0.81 0.95 0.99 0.34
3 3.57 (0.001) -0.12 (0.003) 0.05 (0.004) -0.1 (0.003) 0.01 (0.002) 0.1 (0.002) 0.18 (0.002) -0.05 (0.001)
1 0.22 0.61 0.26 0.54 0.82 0.95 0.34
4 3.57 (0.001) -0.12 (0.004) 0.05 (0.005) -0.09 (0.004) 0.01 (0.003) 0.11 (0.002) 0.18 (0.002) -0.05 (0.002)
1 0.26 0.58 0.31 0.54 0.77 0.9 0.35
5 37.77 (0.045) -3.18 (0.141) -0.51 (0.184) -5.94 (0.132) 2.58 (0.104) 6.64 (0.074) 10.24 (0.067) -1.9 (0.054)
1 0.31 0.47 0.17 0.68 0.92 0.99 0.33
6 37.66 (0.058) -3.39 (0.176) -0.19 (0.221) -5.99 (0.157) 2.44 (0.128) 6.64 (0.092) 10.25 (0.078) -1.9 (0.071)
1 0.34 0.49 0.22 0.64 0.86 0.97 0.36
7 3.72 (0.003) -0.12 (0.006) 0.03 (0.008) -0.07 (0.006) -0.01 (0.006) 0.14 (0.005) 0.2 (0.004) -0.07 (0.002)
1 0.2 0.58 0.3 0.47 0.86 0.98 0.21
8 3.7 (0.001) -0.11 (0.004) 0.01 (0.005) -0.11 (0.004) 0 (0.003) 0.15 (0.002) 0.21 (0.002) -0.05 (0.001)
1 0.25 0.53 0.25 0.52 0.89 0.97 0.31
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Table 8: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the Education sector. P(>0) means the posterior
probability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability
of being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 3.51 (0.001) 0.14 (0.002) -0.17 (0.002) 0.18 (0.001) -0.04 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) -0.04 (0.001) -0.06 (0.001)
1 0.96 0.03 0.99 0.28 0.6 0.29 0.19
2 3.5 (0.001) 0.09 (0.003) -0.16 (0.004) 0.17 (0.002) 0.04 (0.004) -0.02 (0.001) -0.03 (0.001) -0.06 (0.001)
1 0.8 0.13 0.97 0.5 0.43 0.37 0.28
3 3.5 (0.001) 0.18 (0.004) -0.2 (0.005) 0.23 (0.003) -0.09 (0.002) 0 (0.002) -0.02 (0.002) -0.05 (0.001)
1 0.87 0.14 0.93 0.26 0.49 0.44 0.33
4 3.5 (0.001) 0.19 (0.004) -0.2 (0.005) 0.23 (0.004) -0.09 (0.003) 0 (0.002) -0.02 (0.002) -0.04 (0.002)
1 0.83 0.18 0.89 0.29 0.5 0.45 0.36
5 34.61 (0.046) 6.44 (0.139) -7.37 (0.184) 7.21 (0.129) -2.61 (0.105) 0.16 (0.076) -1.09 (0.066) -2.22 (0.052)
1 0.85 0.17 0.87 0.32 0.51 0.4 0.3
6 34.46 (0.059) 6.07 (0.173) -7.07 (0.227) 7.22 (0.163) -2.59 (0.126) 0.07 (0.1) -1.1 (0.08) -2.25 (0.068)
1 0.78 0.23 0.82 0.35 0.5 0.42 0.34
7 3.61 (0.003) 0.22 (0.007) -0.25 (0.01) 0.22 (0.007) -0.11 (0.005) 0.01 (0.004) 0 (0.004) -0.05 (0.003)
1 0.93 0.1 0.93 0.19 0.55 0.46 0.28
8 3.63 (0.001) 0.21 (0.003) -0.27 (0.004) 0.26 (0.004) -0.14 (0.003) 0 (0.002) -0.01 (0.002) -0.05 (0.001)
1 0.9 0.09 0.94 0.16 0.52 0.45 0.3
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Table 9: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the Governance sector. P(>0) means the posterior
probability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability
of being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 4.21 (0) -0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0 (0.001) -0.01 (0.001) -0.02 (0) 0.03 (0) 0.04 (0)
1 0.34 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.28 0.87 0.92
2 4.21 (0) -0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0 (0.001) -0.01 (0.001) -0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.04 (0.001)
1 0.37 0.66 0.52 0.42 0.31 0.8 0.85
3 4.21 (0.001) -0.01 (0.003) 0.01 (0.004) 0 (0.003) -0.01 (0.003) -0.02 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) 0.04 (0.001)
1 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.63 0.64
4 4.21 (0.001) -0.01 (0.004) 0.02 (0.005) 0 (0.004) -0.02 (0.003) -0.02 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002)
1 0.48 0.53 0.5 0.47 0.45 0.6 0.6
5 67.6 (0.047) -1.21 (0.142) 1.62 (0.182) 0.13 (0.126) -1.02 (0.105) -1.25 (0.077) 2.36 (0.064) 2.83 (0.053)
1 0.43 0.58 0.51 0.43 0.4 0.7 0.74
6 67.58 (0.062) -1.06 (0.174) 1.56 (0.231) 0.19 (0.16) -1.17 (0.131) -1.2 (0.098) 2.38 (0.08) 2.87 (0.067)
1 0.44 0.56 0.52 0.43 0.42 0.67 0.7
7 4.54 (0.003) 0.04 (0.004) -0.11 (0.007) 0.04 (0.005) 0.05 (0.006) 0.11 (0.006) -0.06 (0.003) 0 (0.002)
1 0.65 0.22 0.66 0.67 0.78 0.26 0.48
8 4.3 (0.001) 0 (0.003) 0 (0.004) 0 (0.003) -0.05 (0.003) -0.01 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.04 (0.001)
1 0.5 0.49 0.5 0.38 0.48 0.65 0.63
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Table 10: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the Health sector. P(>0) means the posterior
probability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability
of being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 4.47 (0) 0.07 (0.001) -0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0 (0.001) -0.11 (0) 0.04 (0) -0.02 (0)
1 0.99 0.31 0.6 0.46 0 0.97 0.18
2 4.46 (0) 0.07 (0.001) -0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0 (0.001) -0.11 (0.001) 0.04 (0) -0.02 (0)
1 0.97 0.31 0.65 0.43 0 0.93 0.25
3 4.47 (0.001) 0.07 (0.003) -0.03 (0.005) 0.02 (0.003) 0 (0.003) -0.1 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) -0.02 (0.001)
1 0.66 0.44 0.55 0.5 0.2 0.64 0.43
4 4.47 (0.001) 0.07 (0.004) -0.04 (0.006) 0.03 (0.004) -0.01 (0.003) -0.09 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) -0.02 (0.002)
1 0.65 0.43 0.56 0.48 0.26 0.63 0.43
5 88.67 (0.048) 7.43 (0.136) -3.23 (0.173) 2.02 (0.125) -0.65 (0.104) -9.57 (0.074) 3.69 (0.063) -2.1 (0.054)
1 0.88 0.33 0.63 0.45 0.02 0.79 0.31
6 88.62 (0.059) 7.42 (0.178) -3.07 (0.232) 1.99 (0.155) -0.66 (0.126) -9.57 (0.099) 3.59 (0.083) -2.3 (0.071)
1 0.82 0.37 0.61 0.47 0.06 0.74 0.33
7 4.58 (0.003) 0.07 (0.008) -0.04 (0.01) 0 (0.007) -0.01 (0.006) -0.08 (0.004) 0.05 (0.003) -0.03 (0.003)
1 0.65 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.24 0.67 0.34
8 4.57 (0.001) 0.08 (0.004) -0.04 (0.005) 0.02 (0.003) -0.04 (0.003) -0.1 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) -0.03 (0.001)
1 0.69 0.43 0.54 0.41 0.2 0.65 0.38
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Table 11: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the RD sector. P(>0) means the posterior prob-
ability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability of
being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 2.6 (0.002) -0.27 (0.004) 0.41 (0.005) -0.12 (0.002) 0.05 (0.004) -0.07 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) -0.1 (0.002)
1 0.06 0.99 0.14 0.58 0.25 0.82 0.22
2 2.69 (0.002) -0.29 (0.004) 0.42 (0.005) -0.14 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003) -0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.001) -0.11 (0.001)
1 0.04 0.98 0.17 0.64 0.23 0.81 0.13
3 2.36 (0.001) -0.52 (0.003) 0.76 (0.004) -0.19 (0.003) -0.01 (0.003) -0.07 (0.002) 0.15 (0.002) -0.18 (0.001)
1 0 1 0.09 0.48 0.28 0.92 0.04
4 2.36 (0.001) -0.53 (0.004) 0.76 (0.005) -0.2 (0.004) 0 (0.003) -0.06 (0.002) 0.15 (0.002) -0.18 (0.002)
1 0 1 0.14 0.5 0.33 0.85 0.09
5 13.33 (0.047) -4.03 (0.141) 6.95 (0.179) -2.52 (0.127) 0.67 (0.102) -1.82 (0.073) 1.73 (0.061) -2.32 (0.054)
1 0.27 0.82 0.34 0.55 0.35 0.65 0.3
6 13.39 (0.058) -4.27 (0.18) 7.32 (0.234) -2.71 (0.157) 0.68 (0.123) -1.85 (0.096) 1.73 (0.079) -2.46 (0.068)
1 0.3 0.77 0.36 0.54 0.38 0.62 0.32
7 2.6 (0.003) -0.54 (0.005) 0.72 (0.008) -0.07 (0.006) -0.04 (0.005) -0.07 (0.004) 0.14 (0.004) -0.19 (0.003)
1 0 1 0.31 0.39 0.27 0.9 0.04
8 2.71 (0.002) -0.29 (0.006) 0.56 (0.007) -0.21 (0.004) 0.03 (0.003) -0.07 (0.003) 0.09 (0.002) -0.12 (0.003)
1 0.1 0.98 0.12 0.59 0.32 0.76 0.22
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Table 12: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the RPT sector. P(>0) means the posterior
probability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability
of being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 2.11 (0.004) 0.89 (0.003) -0.07 (0.006) -0.39 (0.004) 0.21 (0.004) 0.11 (0.003) 0.7 (0.002) 0.43 (0.002)
1 1 0.38 0.01 0.9 0.8 1 1
2 2.54 (0.005) 0.34 (0.006) -0.11 (0.006) 0.59 (0.004) -0.68 (0.005) -0.52 (0.003) 0.94 (0.004) 0.39 (0.003)
1 0.94 0.31 1 0 0 1 1
3 2.98 (0.001) -0.2 (0.003) 0.23 (0.004) -0.17 (0.003) 0.32 (0.002) -0.47 (0.002) 0.32 (0.002) -0.03 (0.001)
1 0.1 0.89 0.12 0.99 0 1 0.4
4 2.98 (0.001) -0.19 (0.004) 0.22 (0.005) -0.16 (0.004) 0.31 (0.003) -0.47 (0.002) 0.32 (0.002) -0.02 (0.002)
1 0.16 0.83 0.2 0.96 0 0.99 0.44
5 38.63 (0.045) -23.6 (0.14) 19.33 (0.179) -7.41 (0.128) 10.82 (0.104) -11.87 (0.073) 13.93 (0.064) -8.57 (0.055)
1 0 1 0.12 0.97 0.01 1 0.02
6 38.56 (0.057) -23.36 (0.176) 18.92 (0.222) -7.48 (0.161) 10.92 (0.127) -11.68 (0.094) 13.96 (0.081) -8.69 (0.072)
1 0 0.98 0.17 0.94 0.03 0.99 0.06
7 3.48 (0.003) -0.44 (0.006) 0.47 (0.009) -0.25 (0.006) 0.48 (0.005) -0.52 (0.004) 0.19 (0.004) -0.21 (0.003)
1 0 0.98 0.03 1 0 0.94 0.03
8 3.71 (0.002) -0.66 (0.004) 0.48 (0.007) -0.62 (0.004) 0.71 (0.003) -0.33 (0.004) 0.28 (0.003) -0.18 (0.002)
1 0 0.93 0 1 0.04 0.99 0.06
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Table 13: Coefficient posterior means (monte carlo standard errors) for all models for the WSI sector. P(>0) means the posterior
probability that the corresponding coefficient is greater than 0. Coefficeints (other than intercepts) that have >90% posterior probability
of being either positive or negative are bolded.
Covariate Intercept Poverty Dist to School All Injured Food % Land Cultivated Electric % Population
mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse) mean (mcse)
Model P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0) P(>0)
1 2.66 (0.002) 0.06 (0.003) 0 (0.004) 0.06 (0.004) -0.1 (0.003) 0.15 (0.002) -0.17 (0.003) 0.05 (0.002)
1 0.65 0.51 0.64 0.2 0.9 0.16 0.69
2 2.76 (0.002) -0.07 (0.006) 0.21 (0.006) 0.06 (0.003) -0.15 (0.004) -0.03 (0.002) -0.15 (0.004) 0.09 (0.002)
1 0.37 0.81 0.66 0.16 0.38 0.19 0.78
3 2.67 (0.001) 0.03 (0.003) 0.13 (0.004) 0.26 (0.003) -0.39 (0.003) -0.12 (0.002) -0.12 (0.002) 0.08 (0.001)
1 0.58 0.76 0.95 0 0.14 0.14 0.78
4 2.66 (0.001) 0.04 (0.004) 0.12 (0.006) 0.26 (0.004) -0.39 (0.003) -0.12 (0.002) -0.11 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002)
1 0.58 0.7 0.91 0.01 0.21 0.21 0.73
5 19.77 (0.048) 1.04 (0.137) 3.49 (0.183) 4.16 (0.126) -7.18 (0.104) -3.31 (0.078) 0.18 (0.067) -0.63 (0.055)
1 0.57 0.67 0.75 0.1 0.25 0.51 0.44
6 19.75 (0.057) 1.01 (0.177) 3.5 (0.226) 4.26 (0.164) -7.2 (0.129) -3.47 (0.092) 0.11 (0.083) -0.72 (0.068)
1 0.55 0.63 0.71 0.15 0.29 0.5 0.45
7 3.07 (0.003) -0.09 (0.007) 0.3 (0.009) 0.32 (0.007) -0.31 (0.006) -0.32 (0.005) -0.01 (0.003) -0.08 (0.003)
1 0.26 0.95 0.97 0.01 0 0.44 0.19
8 3.16 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0.16 (0.004) 0.36 (0.004) -0.39 (0.003) -0.33 (0.003) -0.02 (0.001) -0.07 (0.001)
1 0.59 0.81 0.97 0.01 0.02 0.41 0.21
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